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In the past, economic integration in Europe was largely compatible with the persistence 
of different national varieties of capitalism. While product market integration intensi-
fied competition, member states could build on and foster their respective comparative 
advantage. To date, this no longer unequivocally holds true. We contend that a new, 
‘Post-Ricardian’ phase of European integration has emerged in which the Commission’s 
and the ECJ’s attempts to further economic integration systematically challenge the 
institutions of organized capitalism. This quest for liberalization has reached a point at 
which its output legitimacy is increasingly uncertain. As a result, the de-politicization 
of EU decisions proves increasingly unsuccessful. In addition, liberalization measures 
rely on a very generous interpretations of the ‘four freedoms’ that exceeds the amount 
of liberalization the member states agreed upon in the European treaties and, therefore, 
lacks input legitimacy. We show this by discussing recent struggles over the Services 
Directive, the Takeover Directive, and company law. In the current phase of European 
integration, the Commission’s and the ECJ’s liberalization attempts either transform 
the institutional foundations on which some of the member states’ economic systems 
rely or they create political resistance to an extent that calls into question the European 
project. The case studies reveal evidence for both of these possibilities.
Zusammenfassung
In der Vergangenheit war die europäische Wirtschaftsintegration mit der Fortexistenz 
unterschiedlicher Kapitalismusmodelle in Europa vereinbar. Angesichts verschärfter 
Konkurrenz auf den Produktmärkten konnten sich die europäischen Volkswirtschaften 
auf ihre komparativen Vorteile konzentrieren und diese im Rahmen ihrer jeweiligen 
Funktionslogiken fortentwickeln. Wir argumentieren, dass die europäische Integration 
in eine neue, „post-ricardianische“ Phase eingetreten ist, in der diese Logik nicht mehr 
gilt: Die Integrationsversuche von Kommission und Europäischem Gerichtshof zielen 
nunmehr direkt auf die Transformation der Institutionen der organisierten Kapitalis-
men. Mit Output-bezogenen Argumenten lassen sich diese Liberalisierungsversuche 
immer weniger legitimieren; folglich erweist sich die Depolitisierung europäischer Ent-
scheidungen als zunehmend erfolglos. Gleichzeitig beruhen die Liberalisierungsversu-
che auf extensiven Interpretationen der „vier Freiheiten“ und gehen damit über das 
in den Verträgen vereinbarte Maß hinaus, sodass ihnen an Input-Legitimität mangelt. 
Dies zeigen wir anhand von Fallstudien über die Dienstleistungsrichtlinie, die Über-
nahmerichtlinie und die Neuinterpretation der Niederlassungsfreiheit. Es existieren 
zwei mögliche Folgen dieser Integrationslogik: Entweder erweisen sich die Integrati-
onsversuche als erfolgreich, was fundamentale Veränderungen der Funktionslogiken 
der organisierten Kapitalismen zur Folge hat; oder sie rufen ein Maß an politischem 
Widerstand hervor, der den Fortgang des europäischen Projekts in Frage stellt. Wie wir 
zeigen, gibt es empirische Anzeichen für beide dieser Möglichkeiten.
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1 Introduction: The problem
To anyone interested in an evaluation of the current state of Europeanization, we rec-
ommend the webpage <www.go-limited.de>. The advertising company, following the 
European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) judgments on Centros (1999), Überseering (2002) 
and Inspire Art (2003), asks German businesses to take advantage of the guaranteed 
European freedom of establishment. Rather than suggesting the actual relocation of 
companies, the advertiser merely provides a vehicle for them to circumvent German 
company law. For 260 euros only, the advertiser offers a complete package for the estab-
lishment of a British ‘limited liability company’ (Ltd.). The advertising firm promises 
several advantages: among them, doing away with German bureaucracy; registration 
of the company in two weeks only; avoidance of strict German personal liabilities; free 
choice of authorized capital as long as it exceeds 1.40 euros (compared to a minimum of 
25,000 euros in the case of a German GmbH1); no supervisory board codetermination 
if the company grows beyond 500 employees.
‘The European legislator is less and less willing to be considerate of the German Sonder-
weg [special route]’, argues lawyer Martin Henssler in a recent newspaper article.2 He 
asks German politicians to restrict supervisory board codetermination to no more than 
one third of the supervisory board seats. This, he argues, is a necessary act of anticipato-
ry obedience. In Germany, close-to-parity codetermination has always been seen as an 
expression of a distinguished ‘social market economy’. Yet has the purpose of European 
integration ever been to put pressure on the organized elements of ‘Rhenish’ capitalism? 
Was not a ‘social model’, in contrast, part of the European promise? What has happened 
to European integration?
The last years have also been characterized by a series of failures of integration proj-
ects, by a so far unknown degree of politicization of European level developments and, 
ultimately, by a crisis of the European project. In July 2001, the European Parliament 
voted down a directive that aimed at creating a European market for corporate control 
by removing national barriers to hostile takeovers. Later, in December 2003, the Eu-
ropean Parliament approved a compromise on the Takeover Directive that had been 
unanimously approved by the Council and that, according to Internal Market Commis-
sioner Bolkestein, was ‘not really worth the paper it was written on’.3 Between 2004 and 
2006, the Commission’s Services Directive caused fierce protests, especially in organized 
economies4 such as Austria, France and Germany. As with the takeover case, the Com-
We would like to thank Fritz W. Scharpf, Susanne K. Schmidt, Tobias Schulze-Cleven, and Christa 
van Wijnbergen for their very helpful comments.
1 The ‘Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung’ (GmbH) is the German version of a British ‘Ltd’.
2 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 February 2006, 23.
3 Financial Times, 18 October 2004, 6.
4 For the purpose of this paper, we distinguish two forms of capitalism in the European Union: 
liberal market economies and organized economies, the latter being distinguished by (a) non-
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mission ended up with a compromise that lagged far behind its aim to effectively lib-
eralize services in the European Union. In 2005 and 2006, the Commission’s proposed 
‘Port Package II’ directive, which aimed at imposing more competition on harbours, led 
to European-wide, sometimes violent, protests. The European Parliament rejected the 
proposal in January 2006 and, two months later, the Commission announced its inten-
tion to withdraw from it. What is more, failure and contestation were not limited to 
individual policy proposals but also affected the constitutional treaty of the European 
Union. In 2005, French and Dutch voters rejected the proposed draft in two referen-
dums. In the French referendum on the European constitution, the people’s ‘non’ was 
largely affected by resistance to the proposed Services Directive.5 More generally, many 
French citizens thought that economic integration had got out of hand.6
In this paper, we contend that European economic integration has entered a new, post-
Ricardian phase in which it systematically clashes with national varieties of capitalism. 
Rather than enhancing competition that builds on existing comparative (institutional) 
advantages, recent Commission initiatives and ECJ rulings propel convergence. Inte-
gration attempts affect market capitalism and organized capitalism differently: they 
asymmetrically target institutions of organized capitalism and, therefore, result in a 
‘clash of capitalisms’. Such proposals may lead to two different outcomes. The first is that 
they are successful and fundamentally change the way in which continental European 
economies operate. The second is that political resistance in the organized economies 
leads to a crisis of political integration. To us, a cross between both possibilities appears 
as the most realistic scenario for the future.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we will outline why we suggest the 
existence of a new phase of European integration and how this relates to the strategies 
of supranational actors. After linking these observations to a more theoretical account 
of ‘delegation’ and ‘agency drift’ in Section 3, the following fourth section offers three 
case studies of the Service Directive, the Takeover Directive, and the ECJ’s rulings on 
company law. In all of these cases, EU actors did not attempt primarily to create a level 
playing field in the EU but instead tried to administer convergence between different 
varieties of capitalism. The final section concludes that a political economy perspective 
helps to better understand the crisis of political integration. In short, the EU lacks the 
legitimacy to alter national varieties of capitalism as much as national welfare states. If 
the Commission and the ECJ nonetheless overstress their mandate, they will provoke 
resistance not only to specific proposals but to the European Union in general.
market coordination between stakeholders and (b) a high degree of institutionalization of eco-
nomic action, i.e. a high degree of public interference in private decisions over finance, invest-
ment, and consumption.
5 See, for example, Financial Times, 20 April 2005, 6; Financial Times, 30 May 2005, 6.
6 For more details, see European Commission (2005a).
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2 Three phases of European economic integration
The history of European economic integration can be divided roughly into three phases: 
Customs Union, Common Market, and Economic Union.7 Obviously, these phases 
overlap and cannot always be neatly separated. Yet, arguably, they do differ in the dom-
inant aim of economic integration. First, between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s the 
aspiration was to create a Customs Union, in which tariffs were removed and trade be-
tween largely autonomous member states was facilitated. In these early years, economic 
integration did not affect national varieties of capitalism. Member states were able to 
build national welfare states and to run their economies largely without outside inter-
ference. If there were converging trends, these were due to a common process of eco-
nomic modernization (Shonfield 1965). The EU institutions at that time had the rather 
limited role of facilitating compromises and making sure that governments lived up to 
their commitments once they had reached an agreement. The High Authority and the 
Court were the ‘guardians of the Treaty’ but not vitally important for deepening inte-
gration (Moravcsik 1998: ch. 2). At this stage, economic integration was not at odds 
with domestic policy goals but was seen as a means of achieving these (Milward/Sø-
rensen 1994: 20–21).
The second phase started with the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon decisions of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in the 1970s and acquired political clout with the Single European 
Act and, more specifically, with the introduction of the principle of ‘mutual recogni-
tion’ (see Alter/Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). Under this provision, goods lawfully sold in 
one member state can also be sold in any other EU country. Mutual recognition is an 
alternative to either harmonization or to the host country principle (Schmidt 2007). In 
contrast to earlier attempts to create the Common Market, mutual recognition is less 
dependent on political agreement. Although exemptions are possible, the country-of-
origin principle leads to an abdication of national sovereignty. Member states are no 
longer exclusively in a position to determine which products can be marketed domesti-
cally.
Another feature of the second phase of economic integration was that European ac-
tors were no longer sidelined but instead took centre stage. Making skillful use of legal 
and political authority to expand their own competencies, they became the ‘engines of 
integration’ (Pollack 2003). However, their room for manoeuvre was unevenly distrib-
uted. European integration has been characterized by the asymmetry between ‘negative’ 
(market-enforcing) and ‘positive’ (market-regulating) integration (Scharpf 1996, 1999: 
43–83). Yet, the discrepancy between negative and positive integration is, in principle, 
compatible with the existence of different institutional varieties of capitalism. Product 
7 Cf. Balassa (1961) for a theoretical account of different stages of economic integration. In con-
trast to his account, which assumes a balanced integration of economic, fiscal, monetary, social 
and tax policy, the actual process of European economic integration has been characterized by 
a highly asymmetrical process of delegating competencies to the EU across policy fields.
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market liberalization increases competition between firms from different countries. As 
long as different institutional settings are associated with different comparative advan-
tages (Franzese 2002: 184–190), transformative pressure on supply-side institutions 
does not necessarily occur. In fact, more competition can reinforce differences between 
countries (or regions) as these build on their respective strengths. If firms shift their 
activities to those countries that offer the best institutional support (for example, with 
respect to the availability of particular skills, flexible vs. stable employment patterns, 
etc.), market integration may make the different institutional settings even more stable; 
in their ‘Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, Hall and Soskice (2001: 57) have called 
this ‘institutional arbitrage’. Hence, the impact of product market integration – includ-
ing increased abilities to relocate production – on different forms of capitalism is an 
indirect one and its direction as yet indeterminate.
Our argument points to something different: European integration, after having large-
ly completed product market integration, has entered a phase since the late 1990s in 
which the quest for liberalization directly targets the domestic institutions of organized 
capitalism. This implies Europeanization as transformation (Schmidt 2002: 901) in the 
strong sense. In this ‘post-Ricardian’ phase, European integration differs from Olsen’s 
(2002: 934) observation that overall ‘European-level developments do not dictate spe-
cific forms of institutional adaptation but leave considerable discretion to domestic ac-
tors and institutions’. The goal of a number of recent Commission initiatives is no long-
er to create a level playing field among EU countries, so that market success is the judge 
of different varieties of capitalism; instead the Commission consciously pushes for the 
‘modernization’ of European economies along the lines of the Anglo-Saxon model.8
Of course, EU decisions sometimes had a transformative impact on national economies 
in the past, too, mainly during the second phase. For example, the European Commis-
sion and the ECJ used EU competition policy, where they were able to decide with-
out the agreement of the Council of Ministers, to push for economic liberalization. In 
these cases, non-political, i.e. bureaucratic, decisions resulted in an assault on the mixed 
economies of many member states (Scharpf 2006: 853). EU actors used their competen-
cies to redefine which economic activities were of public interest and, therefore, exempt 
from Common Market requirements. The difference to the third phase of European 
integration is, however, that these interventions still ran under the heading of ‘non-
discrimination’. The goal was to eliminate a disguised protectionism on the part of the 
member countries to allow for fair competition between companies of different origin. 
Lately, the Commission’s understanding of a level playing field has been changed to 
mean that institutional differences as such are an obstacle to competition. Liberal market 
economies and organized economies are no longer equally valid production regimes 
but the institutions of the latter are seen as barriers to Economic Union. In promoting 
8 This ‘New Economic Policy’ seeks to administer modernization from above. It is no longer com-
mitted to the Ricardian world of comparative advantage, and thus lasting differences, but strives 
instead for convergence. 
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further liberalization, EU actors are able to resort to practices – such as the country-
of-origin principle – that were introduced during the second phase and successfully 
established in product market liberalization.
The case studies demonstrate that recent liberalization attempts have aimed at ultimate-
ly detaching democratic institutions from the economic units they intend to regulate. 
If they were to succeed, they would cause what we call ‘de-institutionalization’. To us, 
institutions are the instruments with which society governs the (economic) behaviour 
of its constituencies (rather than being efficient solutions to coordination problems 
between firms). If national governments even collectively cannot control supranational 
agents, this raises fundamental questions as to the democratic legitimacy of current 
European integration. However, before turning to the case studies, we discuss the theo-
retical relevance of these changes.
3 The politics of delegation
Recently, much of the theoretical literature on EU politics has been cast in principal–
agent language and has made use of the notion of ‘delegation’. Yet, this literature cannot 
adequately account for the cases described in the next section. Either it denies the prob-
lem of agency drift altogether (rationalist perspective) or it falls short of a genuinely 
political understanding of EU actors (neo-functionalism). We do not claim that our 
theoretical perspective is entirely new; we stress, however, that the control of suprana-
tional actors is not just a question about the pace of economic integration, but that it is 
at the heart of the struggle over the future of European capitalism(s).
In general, the main reason for delegating decision-making competencies to the Com-
mission and the ECJ has been the desire to curtail transaction costs. Negotiations 
among 27 member states can be extremely time-consuming and possibly inconclusive 
if the aim is consensus. Moreover, since it is the member states that usually implement 
EU legislation, there is ample room for opportunistic behaviour and non-compliance. 
More specifically, Pollack (2003: 21) identifies four functions of delegation: (1) moni-
toring compliance with the treaty obligations, (2) solving problems with incomplete 
contracting (interpreting the treaties), (3) expert information, and (4) agenda setting. 
Delegation should thus make negotiations more efficient and help to solve collective 
action problems.
The downside of transferring power to agents is that their preferences may differ from 
those of the principals, and effective control mechanisms can eat up the potential gains 
of delegation. Usually agents develop expert knowledge, and a growing information 
asymmetry emerges that renders control even more difficult (Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991: 
25). In deciding whether to delegate, principals thus weigh the costs of agency drift 
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against efficiency gains (McCubbins/Noll/Weingast 1987: 247). However, principals not 
only delegate powers to reduce decision-making costs but also to enhance the credibil-
ity of their commitments to certain policy goals. In the first case, controlling the agent 
is central; in the second, the principals’ self-interests need to be kept in check. Recent 
neo-functionalist arguments have stressed the inability of national governments to con-
trol supranational actors who are, thus, able to push economic integration ahead. Inter-
governmentalist accounts have, in contrast, questioned the scale of unwanted agency 
discretion and instead pointed to the need for credible commitments.
Over the last years, a number of authors have sought to revitalize neo-functionalism. 
For example, Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein have offered a transaction-based 
account of European integration (Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1997; Fligstein/Stone Sweet 
2002). They contend that integration is a response to societal demands for suprana-
tional rules. As cross-border transactions mount, societal actors (mainly, but not only, 
producers) call for common rules. In due course, governments agree to delegate com-
petencies to the European level. Supranational actors help to bring about and enforce 
uniform market rules. Their actions, in turn, facilitate cross-border transactions that 
amplify demand for further supranational rules and centralized decision-making – thus 
generating a self-reinforcing process. In a related argument, Burley and Mattli (1993) 
suggest that the European Court of Justice safeguards member state compliance with 
prior agreements. As the legal system of the European Union is complex and provides 
plenty of opportunities to defect, an independent agent is best suited to monitor com-
pliance. However, due to the doctrines of ‘direct effect’ and ‘supremacy’ the European 
Court of Justice has greatly expanded its competencies beyond what was initially in-
tended (Weiler 1991; Alter 1998). Thus, the ECJ has become one of the ‘engines of Eu-
ropean integration’ (Pollack 2003: ch. 3).
National governments are never fully able to collectively control supranational agents 
because of shorter time horizons and potential disagreements among them. While del-
egation necessarily results in gaps of control, member states are often unable to close 
those gaps (Pierson 1996). There are a number of strategies available for the Commis-
sion and the European Court of Justice to circumvent deadlock in the Council and to 
push integrationist legislation ahead (Héritier 1999; Schmidt 2000). In sum, these argu-
ments rest on the idea that supranational actors propel integration behind the back of 
national governments that have neither anticipated the accretion of EU competencies 
nor been able to effectively confine them.
In the light of our empirical findings, we argue that this rejuvenated neo-functionalism 
focuses too little on the political and economic consequences of supranational activism. 
Economic integration trumps efforts to promote political integration or to build ‘Social 
Europe’. Therefore, integration more often than not means strengthening market forces 
at the expense of political concerns in the member states. As we will show in Section 4, 
if the Commission had its way, a notable liberalization of organized economies would 
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result. The case studies also show, however, that the European Court of Justice might be 
more effective in bringing about change.
The neo-functionalist interpretation of EU politics has not remained unchallenged. Ra-
tional institutionalist accounts emphasize that member governments not only know the 
preferences of the agents but also take the consequences into account. Member states 
delegate tasks to realize otherwise unattainable benefits of cooperation (Tsebelis/Gar-
rett 2001: 363). Moravcsik’s (1998: 36) intergovernmental theory champions the view 
that international cooperation is an attempt to arrange mutually beneficial policy co-
ordination in the face of the negative external effects of unilateral actions. Delegation 
binds parties to negotiation outcomes over time. In principle, precise rules could cred-
ibly commit them, too, but uncertainty about the future makes contracts necessarily in-
complete. Since governments cannot specify all possible contingencies in advance, they 
put supranational actors in charge of monitoring and enforcing their agreement. Hence, 
Moravcsik stresses credible commitment as the rationale for delegating powers.
More strictly rational-choice approaches point out that member states delegate compe-
tencies to supranational actors if there is little conflict between their own views and those 
of the agent or among the principals themselves. For example, Epstein and O’Halloran 
(1999: 51) find that the US Congress delegates decisions if informational concerns, i.e. 
the need for expert knowledge, outweigh distributional issues. Applying the same logic 
to the EU, Franchino (2004) shows that variation in the Commission’s discretion across 
policy areas depends on the level of policy disagreement in the Council and the com-
plexity of an issue area. The general argument runs that the Council anticipates agency 
drift and devises ex ante controls such as the comitology procedures or different rules 
for implementing EU legislation.9
Authors who see efficiency and credible commitments as the main effects of delega-
tion also tend to question that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit (Majone 2000; 
Moravcsik 2002). If the principals fully control the agents and the agents’ preferences 
are more prudent than those of politicians, there is little to worry about in democratic 
terms, and if the Commission were but the guardian of the treaties or a regulatory 
agency, democratic control would be of lesser importance. Delegating powers to the EU, 
in this view, promises welfare gains that the member states individually cannot realize. 
Yet the Commission has become highly politicized and is – much as the ECJ – no longer 
limited to its initial tasks (Majone 2005: 81). The liberalization attempts that we discuss 
below would not be possible either as outcomes of the political processes inside member 
states or as outcomes of negotiations between them. Applying a wide interpretation of the 
‘four freedoms’, Commission and ECJ expand liberalization to an extent that member 
9 If that logic were entirely true, we should not have observed the politicization of recent policy 
initiatives. Yet the Takeover Directive and the Service Directive caused considerable conflict 
among the member states.
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states would not agree to – or, in other words, to an extent that intergovernmentalism 
does not predict.
While opposing purely intergovernmentalist perspectives, we emphasize that our argu-
ment must not be confused with a (neo-)functionalist one. The current state – and 
crisis – of integration can only be understood by looking beyond intergovernmental 
bargains. At the same time, neo-functionalist arguments are too narrowly focused on 
the question of more or less integration. Yet EU politics also involves a struggle between 
‘neo-liberal’ and ‘regulated capitalism’ (Hooghe/Marks 1999). Accordingly, we perceive 
European integration as a power game between actors at the national and European 
level, in which supranational actors systematically use liberalization to expand their 
own scope of responsibility. Therefore, we suppose that the clash between European in-
tegration and organized capitalisms will not vanish in the foreseeable future. We reject 
any foregone conclusion as to which EU policies promote desirable outcomes such as 
economic growth and social justice best. Our only claim in this direction is that cer-
tainty over efficiency gains that may postulate output legitimacy cannot exist. Politics 
in the EU has become politicized because of the transformative character of liberaliza-
tion and its lack of legitimacy. In a recent paper, Hooghe and Marks (2006) proposed a 
‘postfunctionlist’ perspective; we agree, while stressing the prefix ‘post’.
4 The quest for liberalization: Three case studies
The Services Directive
Our first example demonstrates how both the Commission and the Court aim at liber-
alizing more than the member states ever explicitly asked for in the treaties. In fact, the 
Commission’s proposed Services Directive was an example of a de-institutionalization 
attempt in the strong sense. It led to the as yet most far-reaching clash between the 
Commission and the public in several member states and, actually, to a crisis of integra-
tion.
The aim to integrate European services markets is part of the internal market pro-
gramme and the Lisbon strategy in particular (European Commission 2005b). Natural-
ly, services markets are harder to integrate than product markets. While products can be 
exported, services are often attached to a certain place. Frequently they only take place 
when supply and demand come together at the same location. In Article 50 of the Eu-
ropean Treaty,10 member states agreed upon the principle that services suppliers from 
other member states must not be juristically discriminated against. Article 50 states: 
10 In this paper, all cited paragraphs of the European Treaty refer to the new numbering (intro-
duced after the Amsterdam Treaty from 1997).
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Without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right of establishment, the 
person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the State 
where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own 
nationals. (our emphasis)
Compare this to the decisive Article 16 of the Services Directive that the Commission 
proposed in January 2004. The first two paragraphs of Article 16 state: 
(1) Member States shall ensure that providers are subject only to the national provisions of their 
Member State of origin which fall within the coordinated field. Paragraph 1 shall cover national 
provisions relating to access to and the exercise of a service activity, in particular those require-
ments governing the behaviour of the provider, the quality or content of the service, advertis-
ing, contracts and the provider’s liability. (2) The Member State of origin shall be responsible for 
supervising the provider and the services provided by him, including services provided by him in 
another Member State. (Directive Com[2004]0002; our emphasis)
Obviously, the proposed directive turns the basic idea of Article 50 of the treaty upside 
down. Whereas the wordings of the treaty imply that suppliers shall rely on the regula-
tions of the state in which the services take place, the Commission asks the member 
states to agree on the so-called country-of-origin principle (Kowalsky 2004: 237–238). 
The European Court rather than the Commission actually invented this principle. In 
contrast to its judgments until the early 1990s (compare Lorenz/Wannöffel 2005: 25), 
the Court later announced that Article 50 of the European Treaty does not necessar-
ily allow member states to impose their internal regulations on service suppliers from 
other member states:
[T]he application of the host Member State’s national rules to providers of services is liable to 
prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of services to the extent that it involves 
expense and additional administrative and economic burdens.
(Paragraph 30 of the judgment of 25 October 2001, C-49/98)
Therefore, but only partially, the country-of-origin principle is already associated with 
the European freedom of services (for a critical discussion of which, see Schmidt/Blau-
berger/van den Nouland 2007).
Modern economies are institutionalized economies in the sense that economic action 
relies on regulation and supervision of the local authorities in which the economic ac-
tion takes place. However, the country-of-origin principle aimed at forbidding member 
states to supervise and govern economic actions within their own territory. According 
to the proposed directive, the state of Latvia would be responsible for the supervision of 
a Latvian plumber that – temporarily – offers its services in Germany. Yet, obviously, the 
interest of the Latvian state in actually supervising such transactions effectively would 
be weak, no matter whether the firm had Latvian roots in practice or only in theory 
(about which, i.e. the problem of so-called letterbox companies, see our third exam-
ple).
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In fact, the outcome of the liberalization measure would have been an effective de-insti-
tutionalization of economic action. Not surprisingly, the proposal caused fierce protests, 
especially in highly regulated countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and 
Sweden. The longer the discussion lasted, the more unrealistic became an adoption of 
the country-of-origin principle. However, Internal Market Commissioner McCreevy 
(the successor of Bolkestein, who had initiated the directive) refused to withdraw the 
proposed directive although he explicitly said that it was politically non-enforceable.11 
He was also quoted as saying, ‘I am aware of the political consequences in the member 
states, and how difficult it is for governments to achieve things’.12 Protests against the 
Services Directive were exceptionally prominent in France and, in the very context of 
this discussion, the French public rejected the European constitutional treaty in the 
May 2005 referendum. However, only weeks later, the Commission emphasized that 
the French referendum would not affect further liberalization. ‘Of course, the Commis-
sion will pull through its reform programme’,13 announced a speaker for Commission 
President Barroso.
Yet this did not quite happen. The directive was watered down in two steps. First, in 
November 2005, the European Parliament’s Internal Market Committee proposed a 
version in which it maintained the country-of-origin principle but explicitly excluded 
several areas such as labour law and social protection. Second, in February 2006, an EP 
majority went beyond the suggestions of the internal market committee and proposed a 
version in which the country-of-origin principle was abolished. 394 EP members voted 
for the proposal, and 215 EP members voted against it. Comparable to the Takeover 
Directive, a mixture of a left–right divide and a ‘clash of capitalisms’ occurred. Although 
the adopted proposal relied on a compromise between the Socialist and the (conserva-
tive) EVP faction, majorities of conservative EP members (in addition to some others) 
from Great Britain, Spain, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands 
favoured more liberalization – though not necessarily in the radical manner initially 
proposed by the Commission – and voted against the proposal.
It was only then that the Commission announced its intention to revise its proposal. 
In a letter to the Commission, the six countries referred to above protested against the 
Parliament’s extensive watering down of the directive. In April 2006, the Commission 
presented a revised directive that included the changes the Parliament had asked for. 
Resistance to the directive was not strong enough in the Council to establish a blocking 
majority (which – but this is speculation – the Commission might have suspected). In 
May 2006, after eight hours of negotiations in Brussels, the economic ministers of the 
member states unanimously agreed on the directive. The French ‘non’ to the constitu-
tion, however, caused a disruption of the ratification process with, as yet, unforeseeable 
consequences.
11 Tageszeitung, 4 March 2005, 2.
12 International Herald Tribune, 4 March 2005, 1.
13 Die Presse, 1 June 2005 (our translation).
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The Takeover Directive
In the next example, the Takeover Directive, the Commission strategically used its 
power as master of the ‘rules of the game’. In order to find majorities for liberalization 
measures that superseded national preferences, the Commission sought to buy several 
member states out of opposition to liberalization. For this purpose, it intentionally set 
agendas that asymmetrically hurt the member states. Contrary to its rhetoric, the Com-
mission tried to achieve liberalization by avoiding the so-called ‘level playing field’. This 
strategy runs parallel to what Schmidt (1998: 325–329, 2000: 46–50) has called the ‘di-
vide and conquer’ strategy.14
From a comparative political economy perspective, takeover regulation is a decisive 
characteristic of production regimes. In liberal market economies (in the sense of Hall 
and Soskice 2001), takeover regulation aims at activating markets for corporate control 
in order to force managers to act in a shareholder-oriented way. In contrast, organized 
economies are characterized by stakeholder-oriented corporate governance spheres. 
Managers are supervised by company networks, creditors, insiders and large sharehold-
ers rather than takeover markets. The absence of hostile takeovers, in other words, is a 
characteristic feature of the ‘Rhenish’ (Albert 1993) form of capitalism. The emergence 
of markets for corporate control constitutes a major threat to this form of capitalism.
Of course, member states have explicitly obliged the Commission to promote a free 
European capital market. Paragraph 1 of Article 56 of the European Treaty states that 
‘all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Mem-
ber States and third countries shall be prohibited’. Every investor shall be free to invest 
anywhere in Europe. But forbidding restrictions on the free capital flow is different 
from forbidding restrictions on hostile takeovers. The member states neither agreed 
on harmonizing takeover regulation in order to actively promote hostile takeovers nor 
consented – which is the logical consequence – to providing shareholders with primacy 
over stakeholders. Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, however, made no 
secret of the fact that exactly this was intended by the Takeover Directive: ‘If Europe 
really wants to become the most competitive and most modern economic area, it must 
leave the comfortable setting of the Rhenish model and subject itself to the harsher 
conditions of the Anglo-Saxon form of capitalism.’15
The Commission presented a draft directive in 1989. It was changed several times until, 
in June 2001, the European Parliament voted down a (still relatively liberal) conciliation 
14 Schmidt uses the term ‘divide and conquer’ to describe the Commission’s strategic use of in-
fringement procedures in order to change member states’ preferences on liberalization meas-
ures. In both cases, the Commission tries to play opposing member states off against each other 
by manipulating their pre-strategic interests. We thank Susanne Schmidt for her suggestion that 
in both cases, in principle, the Commission’s strategy would be unsuccessful if the liberalization-
opposing member states committed themselves to ‘solidaristic’ behaviour.
15 Neue Züricher Zeitung, 9 November 2002, 83 (our translation).
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compromise by the narrowest possible margin: 273 EP members voted for the proposed 
directive, 273 voted against, and 22 abstained. The proposed directive had aimed at 
strictly implementing the so-called neutrality rule, i.e. obliging managements not to 
start any defensive measures against hostile takeovers unless the shareholders’ meeting 
explicitly authorized the management board to do so. Hix, Noury and Roland (2006: 
265) accordingly call the Takeover Directive ‘one of the most high profile pieces of leg-
islation ever to pass through the European parliament’. The battle over the Takeover 
Directive witnessed an amount of politicization that, until then, had been unknown.
The European Parliament’s vote has been analysed in several articles (Callaghan/Höpner 
2005; Ringe 2005; Hix/Noury/Roland 2006: ch. 11). While a left–right divide occurred 
among the small parties, members of the large conservative and social democratic EP 
factions voted with respect to their national origin (‘clash of capitalisms’ constellation). 
The less shareholder-oriented national corporate governance regimes were, the more 
likely it was that both factions uniformly opposed the proposed directive. Conversely, 
when the corporate governance system of the country of origin was relatively share-
holder-oriented, social democratic EP members joined their conservative counterparts 
in supporting the directive.
In what follows, we will focus on the Commission’s strategy after the rejection of the 
2001 compromise. Although a group of experts proposed a version of the directive in 
2002 that aimed at liberalizing even more than the 2001 version (see below), the Com-
mission finally ended up standing alone against a front of member states which agreed 
to a solution that was rather ineffective from the perspective of the initially intended 
systems change.
In order to find ways out of its blocked liberalization attempt, the Commission appoint-
ed a High-Level Group of Company Law Experts, led by Jaap Winter, which presented 
its report in January 2002. The main problem was the relationship between takeover 
law and other areas of national company law: as long as most member states allowed 
companies to introduce several forms of unequal voting rights, de facto defensive meas-
ures against hostile takeovers exceeded those measures the Takeover Directive intended 
to remove. The Winter group suggested temporarily abandoning all forms of unequal 
voting rights during takeover contests. Strikingly, the revised directive proposal upon 
which the Commission decided in October 2002 differed from the Winter report in an 
important manner. Besides introducing the strict neutrality rule, it aimed at inhibiting 
all regulations that restrict the voting rights of single shareholders to defined amounts 
(such as, for example, twenty per cent of the overall vote). However, the proposed direc-
tive did not affect multiple voting rights. Multiple voting rights imply, for example, that 
the shares of certain shareholders are weighted twice as high as those of others.
The Commission made the rationale behind the revised blueprint very clear. ‘The Inter-
nal Market Commissioner perceives it as important to secure majorities for his projects’, 
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explained Bolkestein’s speaker Jonathan Todd.16 Germany had already abolished un-
equal voting rights in its 1998 Corporate Sector Supervision and Transparency Act.17 
In contrast, multiple voting rights – widespread especially in Sweden and France, but 
also present in countries like Belgium, Great Britain, Finland and Denmark – were 
permitted to remain intact. The Commission knew it lacked a majority for its liberaliza-
tion measures, but it assumed it would find support for its project if it asymmetrically 
hurt Europe’s largest economy to the benefit of other countries’ firms. A majority of 
Commissioners hoped to successfully prevent member countries from joining Ger-
many in an opposition front against the Takeover Directive.18 Liberalization, in other 
words, only seemed achievable by not constructing a level playing field. Interestingly, in 
the early summer of 2002, when the Commission’s plans first became generally known, 
Bolkestein announced that multiple voting rights cannot impede takeovers – which is 
obviously absurd – and that the Commission might address multiple voting rights at a 
later point in time if they turned out to be systematically used to hamper the market for 
corporate control.19 If the Commission had succeeded with its asymmetrical proposal, 
abolishing multiple voting rights at a second stage might have become a possible future 
option. This could have happened but did not.
In February 2003, the Greek Council Presidency tried to formulate a middle way be-
tween the Winter report and the Commission’s proposal that also targeted the Scandina-
vian-style multiple voting rights. However, the French double voting rights remained 
untouched. This caused fierce resistance from Sweden, Finland and Denmark, in which 
the Wallenberg group especially – by far the most important family-owned investor 
group in Sweden – figured prominently. France insisted that its model of double vot-
ing rights did not cause any restrictions to hostile takeovers. In contrast, the German 
government insisted that a fair solution would also have to forbid the French double 
voting rights, thereby being quite aware of the fact that, if it succeeded, the outcome 
would be a blocking minority with France and the Scandinavian countries at its core. 
More and more, the member countries began to agree upon a ‘harmless’, non-trans-
formative solution. As a consequence, the Commission’s strategy to split the member 
states ran aground. In October 2003, Commissioner Bolkestein announced his inten-
tion not to support a solution ‘without any value added to the current situation’.20 The 
Commission’s veto implied the necessity of unanimity among the member states, i.e. 
resistance of a single country could have prevented a Council compromise. But this 
strategy also failed. In the end, the Commission achieved the opposite of what it had in-
tended: rather than having isolated Germany, it stood alone in the face of a united front 
against its liberalization plans. The European Parliament accepted the compromise in 
December 2003.
16 Financial Times Deutschland, 4 October 2002, 29 (our translation).
17 Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG).
18 Protest against the asymmetric proposal also occurred inside the Commission; see Financial 
Times Deutschland, 25 September 2002, 14.
19 See Börsen-Zeitung, 22 June 2002, 6.
20 Börsen-Zeitung, 14 October 2003, 7 (our translation).
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Company law and the European Court of Justice
Our third example demonstrates that the European Court of Justice is an independent 
factor of European liberalization. Though the practical effects of its judgments on the 
member states’ capacity to monitor and regulate their economies do not lag behind 
those of the Commission, the Court’s rulings are widely seen as technical, rather than 
political, matters (Burley/Mattli 1993: 44). Therefore, the Court’s liberalization meas-
ures are not affected by the wave of politicization of European affairs that occurred after 
Maastricht. We focus on a series of company law decisions that ruled that the so-called 
seat-of-management principle violates European law. The consequence is a de-institu-
tionalization comparable to the liberalization attempt witnessed in the first case study.
In the past, the German Federal Court of Justice – just like the courts of Austria, Belgium, 
France, Luxemburg, Portugal and Spain – judged in line with the seat-of-management 
(or seat-of-administration) rule. This principle implies that the company law of the na-
tion in which a firm is domiciled, rather than the law of the nation in which it is incor-
porated, must be applied to the firm. In other words, if a firm’s administrative seat was 
in Germany, it could only retain corporate status if it had been incorporated in accord-
ance with German law. This held until the ECJ decisions on Centros, Überseering and 
Inspire Art in 1999, 2002 and 2003 respectively. According to the European Court of 
Justice, the seat-of-management principle is inconsistent with the freedom of establish-
ment under the EU Treaty even if so-called letterbox firms are involved. Therefore, the 
seat-of-management rule has had to be replaced by the origin-of-incorporation rule.
One of the ‘four freedoms’ guaranteed by the Treaties is the freedom of establishment: 
Restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory 
of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions 
on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State estab-
lished in the territory of any Member State. (Article 43 of the European Treaty)
Article 48 adds: 
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their 
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community 
shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are 
nationals of Member States.
Accordingly, until 1999, only few would have insisted that the treaty also guaranteed 
the right to freely choose among the national company laws provided by the member 
states.
The Centros decision raised doubts about the seat-of-management rule without clearly 
replacing it. Centros Ltd., a wine company, was established by two Danes under Brit-
ish law. In terms of its business, however, the firm was exclusively engaged in Denmark. 
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The incorporators announced that the only reason for the foreign incorporation was 
to avoid the minimum capitalization requirement for Danish companies. The Danish 
commercial registry argued that this approach was an unlawful circumvention of Dan-
ish minimum requirements and therefore refused to register the company’s branch of-
fice. The entrepreneurs went to the ECJ. In its statement to the Court, the Commission 
argued that the complainants were right and that the Danish state was not allowed to 
apply its own standards on Centros. The Court decided for the firm’s and Commission’s 
position (decision of 9 March 1999, C-212/97).
The Court argued that the use of foreign letterbox companies to explicitly circumvent 
Danish minimum requirements was a legitimate measure that must not be objected to 
by the state the firm operates in:
[T]he fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company chooses to form 
it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set 
up branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of estab-
lishment. … [T]he fact that a company does not conduct any business in the Member State in 
which it has its registered office and pursues its activities only in the Member State where its 
branch is established is not sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct 
which would entitle the latter Member State to deny that company the benefit of the provisions 
of Community law relating to the right of establishment. (Paragraphs 27 and 29)
In what followed, lawyers discussed controversially whether the Court had generally for-
bidden member states to apply the seat-of-management rule. It was the German Federal 
Court of Justice that called for a leading decision. In the case at hand, Überseering BV, 
a Dutch construction firm, employed a German contractor, a limited liability company 
(GmbH). The BV sued the GmbH for damages by reason of alleged defects in the work 
performed. Just prior to the filing of suit, however, the BV was purchased by two Ger-
mans, who then managed the BV from Germany. The lower German courts dismissed 
the BV’s complaints against the German contractor as long as the owners refused to 
form a GmbH out of the BV; in its current form, the German court argued, the BV had 
no legal capacity in Germany. In its decision, the European Court – in accordance with 
the Commission’s statement on the case – judged that the BV was right (decision from 
5 November 2002, C-208/00). With this decision, the seat-of-management rule was top-
pled. But Überseering was not a letterbox firm in the classical sense.
A third decision combined the generality of the Überseering decision with a Centros-
style circumvention matter. A Dutchman established Inspire Art Ltd. under British 
law and requested the registration of the company’s Dutch branch office. The Dutch 
registry refused and argued that specific Dutch minimum rules for foreign companies 
– above all, a certain minimum capitalization – applied. Again, the European Court 
sided with the company and with the Commission (decision from 30 September 2003, 
C-167/01). The Dutch state, the Court argued, was not allowed to impose its corporate 
law minimum standards on Inspire Art although it operated nowhere else than in the 
Netherlands.
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These juridical innovations have far-reaching consequences (compare, from a German 
law perspective, Maul/Schmidt 2003; Binge/Thölke 2004; Sandrock 2004a).21 They im-
ply an effective deregulation of European company laws. Most notably, this deregulation 
applies to situations in which, from the perspective of the member states, no foreigners 
are involved. The decisions effectively hollow out national company law.22 Therefore, 
the protests against the Court’s decisions have nothing in common with protectionist 
reflexes. The decisions actually apply the American situation to Europe: in the US, most 
firms are founded in the state of Delaware because of its lax requirements (see, for ex-
ample, Roe 2005). Whoever dislikes his national company law is now free to pick one 
of the other members’ company laws (Kirchner/Painter/Kaal 2004). As a consequence, 
the decisions put company laws, not production locations, into direct competition with 
each other and impose pressure to deregulate. Tony Blair has already declared his aim 
to let the British Ltd. become the European Delaware firm.23 In fact, the decisions have 
caused a boom of Ltd.-type foundations in Germany. The advertiser mentioned in the 
introduction is the market leader for Ltd.-type foundations in Germany. It claims to 
have already founded around 28,000 limited liability companies in Germany.
So far, perhaps the most explosive – and from a political economy viewpoint most rel-
evant – matter has not been juristically clarified: the impact of the Court’s decisions on 
supervisory board codetermination in countries such as Germany (Kamp 2004; San-
drock 2004b). The current situation is that no supervisory board codetermination 
would be applied to a purely German Ltd. that grows beyond the amount of 500 em-
ployees – and, to us, it seems a remarkable fact that such a situation could arise out of 
the European Treaties in which no restriction on national codetermination laws were 
ever, implicitly or explicitly, intended. In its statement on the Centros case, the German 
government argued that, regardless of other reasons, the seat-of-management principle 
was necessary in order to secure appliance of employees’ codetermination rights (see 
paragraphs 87–89 of the Centros decision). The European Court did not uphold this 
objection. However, in the Überseering decision, the Court declared in a very cautious 
and reluctant wording: 
It is not inconceivable that overriding requirements relating to the general interest, such as the 
protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees and even the taxation 
authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, justify restrictions 
on freedom of establishment. (Paragraph 92)
21 Until now, the rejection of the seat-of-management-rule has been confirmed in two other ECJ 
decisions of general principle: in the decisions on Sevic Systems (from 13 December 2005, C-
411/03) and on Cadbury Schweppes (from 12 September 2006, C-196/04).
22 Compare the striking title of Binge/Thölke (2004): ‘Everything goes – The German interna-
tional company law after Inspire Art’ (our translation).
23 See Börsen-Zeitung, 15 September 2004, 2.
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So far, it is unclear whether this may authorize the German state to impose supervisory 
board codetermination on foreign legal forms that operate in Germany.24, 25
In fact, the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art decisions are not the only European 
threats to the member states’ codetermination laws. The European Company Statute 
and the Merger Directive also create the possibility of ‘codetermination-free zones’. 
Legal possibilities do not necessarily imply that actors choose them. So far, German 
companies with foreign legal forms rarely have more than 500 employees. However, 
our benchmark is a situation in which the state – in the strong sense of an institution – 
could govern the codetermination behaviour of the companies inside its national terri-
tory. European liberalization has led to a situation in which this ability diminishes. The 
realistic scenario is certainly not that companies will escape from supervisory board co-
determination as soon as they are juristically allowed to. Rather, we anticipate a smooth 
but ongoing evolution of heterogeneity of codetermination practices in Germany that, 
in the medium term, will put pressure on the government to generally cutback codeter-
mination rights.
5 Conclusion: Mechanisms of liberalization and the lack of legitimacy
After having largely completed the Internal Market for products, European economic 
integration has entered a post-Ricardian phase. Attempts to liberalize services, takeover 
practices and company law differ in their potential consequences from product market 
integration. Now the Court and the Commission directly target member states’ insti-
tutions and aim at transforming them, even in situations in which no other country’s 
economic activities are involved at all. We have argued that European-level actors have 
extended the interpretations of the ‘four freedoms’ to an extent that it becomes in-
creasingly questionable whether the wordings and spirit of the treaties provide (input) 
legitimacy for the respective liberalization measures. However, one might object, it is 
so obvious that the member states are deadlocked with immobility and overregulation 
that the ‘neo-liberal bias of the EU, if it exists, is justified by the social welfarist bias of 
current national policies’ (Moravcsik 2002: 618).
We argue that this objection fails to provide (output) legitimacy. The impact of EU 
legislation differs across member states since Europe consists of various forms of capi-
talism (Fioretos 2001). Some may benefit from deregulation. For others, however, liber-
24 See, for example, Marcus Creutz in Handelsblatt, 9 November 2005, 37; Martin Henssler in 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 February 2006, 23.
25 Unsurprisingly, German employers claim that such an act would be inconsistent with the free-
dom of establishment. See the employers’ comments to the report of the German Codetermina-
tion Commission (Kommission zur Modernisierung der deutschen Unternehmensmitbestim-
mung 2006: 56–58).
22 MPIfG Discussion Paper 07 /4
alization could result in a decomposition of the internal logic their production regimes 
rely on. What has already been shown for the different European welfare regimes holds 
true (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000: 159: Brinegar/Jolly 2005: 176; Menz 2005): Europeaniza-
tion has quite different meanings for different member states. Yet if Europe really wants 
to become the most competitive economic area worldwide, and if the different institu-
tional forms of capitalism differ in their comparative advantages, should not European 
integration secure the free flow of products, services and capital, but protect the respec-
tive internal logics of the member states’ economic systems? Would this not imply, in 
particular, sheltering member states from de-institutionalization?
We may, or may not, be right here. But we suggest that the efficiency gains are too uncer-
tain (to say the least) to provide output legitimacy. Deregulating the economy is a genu-
inely political decision that cannot be left to independent agents. Therefore, it requires 
input legitimacy. Whether the member states need a ‘neo-liberal’ corrective is not for 
the observer to choose but must be the result of public deliberation and parliamentary 
decisions – otherwise, the price to pay is a serious democratic deficit. However, instead 
of a strengthening of input-oriented legitimacy, we witness ongoing – yet increasingly 
unsuccessful – attempts to de-politicize EU politics. European-level actors transform 
essentially political matters into apparently technical ones. An extensive interpretation 
of the ‘four freedoms’ of the European Treaty allows Commission and Court to enforce 
liberalization measures juridically. The law shields these attempts from political resist-
ance especially in organized economies (cf. Burley/Mattli 1993).
Our discussion of the three empirical cases has also identified some of the sources of 
the Commission’s ability to extend its liberalization attempts beyond the level member 
states ever agreed upon. The first, and perhaps most important, is its freedom of inter-
preting the treaties, combined with a substantial freedom of choice between modes of 
integration, such as coordination or harmonization.26 Second, the Commission sets 
the agenda for the Council and the European Parliament. It can start with a politically 
non-enforceable, maximally transformative liberalization attempt in order to evaluate 
member states’ reactions. Third, it strategically uses the threat of non-decisions. Fourth, 
the Commission intentionally proposes asymmetrical measures in order to establish 
26 This includes not only extensive interpretation of some goals but also the downplaying of oth-
ers. Compare, for example, two quotes of Internal Market Commissioner McCreevy on dif-
ferent areas of economic integration. The first is about forbidding member states to tolerate 
firms’ unequal voting rights. He says, ‘my goal is that the “one share, one vote” principle must be 
accepted in every member state’ (Neue Züricher Zeitung, 18 October 2005, 27; our translation). 
The second quote relates to integration in the field of tax policy, a field that is explicitly men-
tioned in Article 93 of the European Treaty. The Austrian economic magazine Wirtschaftsblatt 
asks McCreevy, ‘The finance ministers are currently debating the introduction of a uniform 
taxable base for corporate income tax. Do you oppose this?’ McCreevy answers, ‘Without doubt 
I oppose this’. ‘Why?’ asks Wirtschaftsblatt; McCreevy responds, ‘Because this opens up a back-
door to tax harmonization. I want competition’ (Wirtschaftsblatt, 8 April 2006, 11; our transla-
tion). This nicely illustrates the eminently political character by which the Commission uses its 
freedom of interpretation to set itself its own goals.
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and destroy coalitions (adopting a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy in the terminology of 
Schmidt).27 It is free to add redistributive zero-sum games between member states to 
its proposals until an attainable majority of supporters emerges. Fifth, the Commission 
uses its veto power in order to weaken defensive majorities among member states. In 
the situation of a Commission’s veto, buying a single member state out of the opposi-
tion to liberalization implies that non-transformative directives cannot be passed.28
Relying on principal–agent theory, much of the recent literature has focused on the 
efficiency gains of delegating powers. Autonomous decisions of non-elected actors are 
frequently welcomed because they are meant to creatively ‘fill in gaps in the legal frame-
work’ and ‘ensure the achievement of the Treaties’ objectives notwithstanding legislative 
inertia on the part of the Council’ (Arnull 2003: 180). However, inertia might be a safe-
guard against transformative decisions that lack legitimacy. Frequently, the literature on 
the Commission and the ECJ assumes that activist behaviour on the part of European 
agents is normatively desirable because it produces better results than political nego-
tiations (Pollack 2003: 408). Yet, contested decisions and transformative measures fail 
the test of output legitimacy. The EU has moved beyond the stage of technical harmo-
nization or purely regulatory policies. Boundary redrawing deeply affects the member 
states’ ability to govern the economy, and governments are unable to control further 
integration: ‘… free circulation and competition policies are the kernel of the atomic 
engine of the integration process, an engine that is quite difficult, even for the Council, 
to switch off or even to cool down’ (Bartolini 2005: 185). If this is the case, the indirect 
legitimation of European institutions seems an insufficient democratic basis for eco-
nomic liberalization.
We have suggested that the liberalization attempts of the post-Ricardian phase are either 
successful or they bring about crises of integration. Failed referendums on the consti-
tutional treaty and considerable Euro-scepticism throughout the Union indicate that 
the ‘permissive consensus’ of European integration is dissolving. ‘Integration by stealth’ 
(Majone 2005) has reached its limit because European decisions are in conflict with 
national welfare traditions or, as we have shown, with European varieties of capitalism. 
Paradoxically, for the Commission the appropriate answer to the recent crises seems 
to be to push integration further. After the French and Dutch rejection of the con-
27 Compare footnote 15.
28 We perceive it as an open question whether or not these mechanisms are so well rehearsed 
that the selection of Commissioners hardly makes any difference any more. However, it is a 
fact that, in the period we observe, the Internal Market Commissioners (Bolkestein, McCreevy) 
have been distinguished by their commitments to the primacy of the free market. A similar 
point can be made with respect to the Commissioners for Competition (Monti, Croes). Since 
2004, the Presidency has shared the same beliefs. Hyman (2006: 248) calls Barroso a ‘born-again 
neoliberal’. Hooghe (2003: 284–286) shows how Commissioners’ preferences on European inte-
gration differ decisively from those of both national elites and the European public. Therefore, 
good reasons exist for integration research to engage in a ‘sociology of Commissioners’ (Smith 
2003). 
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stitutional treaty, Internal Market Commissioner McCreevy explicitly refused to take 
the proposed Services Directive off the table, and Commission President Barroso an-
nounced that the Commission would ‘of course’29 push through its reform programme. 
The modified Lisbon process concentrates on the completion of the Internal Market, 
mainly in finances and services. Given the degree of political opposition, this might 
further disaffect a Euro-sceptic public.
29 Compare footnote 13.
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